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' ' 
DiTERESTS AID PO!...ICIES Iii SOu"T.H:SAS'? ASL\ 
Commencement Address by Senator !1ue r:.ansfield (D ., l·iontana) 
Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 
S\mday, ,Tun~ 10, 1962, 4;00 p.m., E.S .T. 
~.s .':'. 
I am happy to be with you and grateful for the privilege of join-
i~ the class of 1962. It is especially pleasant to be here because of past 
coutacts with your faculty and, most especially, vith my old f~iend, E~nest 
Melby, former Chancellor of the University of Montana. 
Members of the Michigan S-cate staff are ofte-n encountered in \·:ash-
ington and in the far-flung corners of the world . I cannot remember the 
number of times, for example, that I have run into your Professor He.;;ley 
Fisnel a:::~.d m..v old colleague f~om Montana, Professo.c Guy l"ox, in Saigon. 
Togethe~ with the rest of the t~aining-mission of Michigan State, they have 
made important contributions to the Re~ublic of Viet Nam. As for your Presi-
dent, Dr . Hannah, his travel-mileage on behalf of the nation--and, inciden-
tally, Michigan State--is r ival ed only by that of the Secr etary of State and 
Members of Congress . 
I have heard i t said that the sun never sets on the faculty of 
Michigan State . It i s reassuring, ther efore, to come here and discover 
that the faculty has a natural habitat . It is such a delightful habitat 
one wonders why so many of its members have been persuaded to leave for 
the enervating tropics of Asi a and Hashington. 
They have been persuaded, I suspect, even as the nation has been 
persuaded, to enter into nev channels of i nternational activity, by the 
events of the paat two decades . ?he nation has become deeply committed 
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I have chosen it, finally, because I suspect you are sufficiently ins)~red 
at this moment not to require an inspirational speecn from me . rience, I 
shall give you what are, in my opinion, the sober facts of one of tnc 
situations which confront the Nation, facts to which you are entitled as 
mature men and women, as citize~s of the United States. 
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througilou·~ tile world. Skilled members of thiz un:'~ve~s:i.ty a:e among the 
thousands of Americans who are working abroad with great dedication to 
d~scharge that co~~itment . 
It j_s to this commitment, notably, as it is involved in Southeast 
Asia which I would e~dress your attention. I have chosen this subje¢t, in 
pa=t, becsuse of the close association which has existed between ~ichig&n 
State and Viet Nam. I have chosen it, too, in part because evants appear 
to ba moving in Southeast Asia towards a point of critical decision. L J...,.._.,f\.t 
As you know, ~e have recently lacied combat forces in Thailand. 
This movement of troops follows the strengt.hening of the United States 
uilits=y t4ain1ng mission in Viet Nac. Both steps repreGent a deepening of 
an already very deep involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland. 
In this, as in all cases of foreign policy and milita--y co~nd, 
tne responsibility for the direction of the nation's course rests wi~h the 
President . It is a grave and difficult responsibility. In discharging it, 
~he ?resident i s entitled to the understanding and support of the nation. 
~1.-Y I say that he has had both in the Senate of the United States, fro:n the 
leadership of both parties . He has kept the Congress fully informed on the 
s!.tu&tion as it has developed. In a si~~lar manner he bas tried to keep the 
people of the nation informed through his frequent press conferences. 
Support of the President does not preclude public discussion of 
the situation in Sou~heast Asia . On the contra--y, it presupposes it . The 
President would be the last to expect a moratorium on public participation 
of this kind. It is politics that needs to stop at the water 's edge, not 
serious consideration of the nation's course in its relations with the rest 
of the world . Rather than less, we need more public consideration of this 
matter . 
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The need is especially acute with respect to Southeast Asia . 
Until rccen~ times it has been an area remote ~rom the geGeral ah~eness 
of the nation. It is not surprising that the public, even today, knows 
little about the region. Indeed, it is doubtful that a decade ago, more 
than a small fraction of the civilian and military personnel of the govern-
ment and the journalists who are now immersed in its place-names could have 
quickly located the Kingdom of Laos, let alone its towns and villages, on a 
map of Asia. 
Yet this obscure land on the borders of South China now writes 
headline after headline in the daily press. It keeps the lights on through 
the night in the Pentagon, the State Department and the Cent.ral Intelligence 
Agency. It has been the immediate cause of the dispatch of United States co~­
bat forces to Thailand and a partial cause of the strengthening of the mili-
tary mission in Viet Nam. In a decade about $4oO million in U.s. military 
and other aid has gone into this one nation whose population is far smaller 
than that of the Detroit Metropolitan region and is scattered in jungle and 
hill over an area the size of Oregon. 
In 1953 when I first visited Laos, just two junior resident State 
Department officials were deemed sufficient for the protection of all Un.ited 
States interests in the entire country. A~ost a decade later, hundreds of 
officials from half a dozen federal agencies--military and civilian- -were 
on the scene . 
This transition in Laos highlights the transition in the United 
States rela\.ionship with all of Southeast Asia. From a minimum of contact 
and cost scarcely a dozen years ago we have moved, today, to a point of 
saturated involvement and immense expense . This progressive involvement 
has not been a party matter--e. republican policy or a democratic policy. 
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It began under a Democratic Administration. It intensified sharply under a 
Republican Ad~tnistration . And it is now being dealt with once again by a 
Democratic Administration . 
The roots of this involvement in Soatheas~ Asia lie in the vast 
disploca.tion which was produced. in Asia by Ho:-ld ;:~ II. But in a more 
specific sense, it dates from the period of the Korean Conflict. 
You will recall that about a dozen years ago revolution swept like 
a giant tidal wave through China . It sp~J~ed over the Chinese borders in the 
~orth, into Ko~ea . It gave every sigc of engulfing Indo-China to the South. 
?nat region, itself, was in the midst of a mixed and confusing Communist-
oa~io!:alist-monarchist upheaval, but in esser:tials, a revolution against the 
reassertion of French colonial control after Horld 1/!ar II . 
Engaged in the conflict in Korea, we sought for strategic reasons 
to prevent Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. So we began to go to the 
aid, first, of the French and after them, the successor governments of Indo-
China- - in Vie~ Nam, Laos and Cambodia. 
The military s i tuation was eventually stabilized in Korea by 
negotiations . It was also stabilized in Indo-China largely through the 
diplomacy which produced the Geneva A~·ee~ents of 1954. 
A kind of uneasy truce settled over Asia. But there was no change 
i~ the deep- seated hostility between Chinese co~unis~ and the United States. 
?eking continued to single us out as the number one enemy of the Chinese 
people . vle continued the policy of uartime boycott of the Chinese mainland--
total economic and cultural boycott and almost total diplomatic boycott . The 
military situation in both the Fo~san Straits and Korea remained ominous . 
The political situation in the divided countries of Laos and Viet Nam re-
~ined unsettl ed. 
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There followed, then, a United States effort 'vo ~eep China out of 
Southeast Asia and to forestall the spread of communism in that region. It 
was at this point that our direct involvement began to deepen in earnest. He 
embarked upon a massive military aid program to Southeast Asian nations. All 
policy was directed preponderantly to the building of s~rong anti-co~unist 
military establishments and governments. He soug:at, further, to bring the 
region under the protectiva umbrella of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 
SEATO, which was expected to 'Clarshall nations both iV'i tllin and without the area 
for a common defense of the region against comm~nisu. 
In Laos and in south Viet Nam, particular.\y, the immense cos~ of 
sustaining the large military establishments built by u.s. military aid re-
quired, in turn, large annual economic aid-subs~dies to these countries. 
Neither form of aid has had much effect on the economic or social well-being 
of the ordinary people of these nations. Tbe principal gain of these programs 
has flowed to a relatively small number of persons in the cities and to mili-
tary personnel. 
In addition, to this massive military and military-support program 
of aid, som~ effort was made to help improve the lot of the ordinary people 
by technical and other assistance for eco~omic and social development. 
Finally, I should mention the extension of the information program 
into Southeast Asia. Aga:!.n, the contrast in ten years is significant. From 
a minor operation confined largely to the environs of the cities of Saigon 
a~d Bangkok, the voice of America has been carried by radio and pamphlet and 
motion picture, by boat, plane, jeep and foot and, I ivould presume even by 
elephant, into the remotest villages and hamlets of Southeast Asia. The 
output of words increased massively and impressively. So, too, of co~·se, 
did the cost tothe people of the United States . 
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Over a ten-year period, the forei~ aid-program--military and non-
milita.-y--alone has resulted in authorized appropriations of the public fucds 
of this nation of well over $3 bi~ion ~or these Southeast Asian nations . 
This total does not take into account tee salaries and expenses of the 
thousands of mil~ta:.."Y and civilian personnel of the government ,.,ho have seen 
service in the area during this period. It does not take into account the 
cost of our participation in SEATO and consequent military deployments such 
as has occurred in recent weeks in and around Thailand. It does not take 
into account the cost of the expansion of the information, pl"Oe,rams and 
other government act~vity . 
Altozether, the commitment of r esources to Southeast Asia in a 
decade has been enormous by any measure . Yet it would be a small price to 
pay if it were to yield a durable peace and safeguard an opportunity for 
the growth of stable free nations in that region. Unfortunately, the ex-
perience of the past decade is not such as to give rise to sanguine expecta-
tions in this respect. 
We have the experience of SEATO . It is difficult to assess its 
value in fores~alling military adventures by the Communists . Perhaps it 
has had some effect; perhaps it has not . 
clear by the recent military deployment . 
But one thing has been made very 
\ve have allies under SEATO to be 
sure, but allies either unwilling or unable to assume but the smallest frac -
tion of the burdens of the alliance . I say that not as cri~icism of any 
member of SEATO . Each nation has its own problems and capacities and I do 
not presume to judge them. But this nation, too, has its problems . And 
one of them is to avoid miscalculations in policies which may derive from 
the gap between the presumed promise and the actual fulfillment in any mili-
te.ry alliance . 
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Under the leader ship of President Nyo Dinh Diem, a man for whom I have 
the highest r espect and the deepest adm~ration, a man whose in~e6rity 
and honesty are unquestioned, and vdthout whom there would be no fret 
Vietnam, that country has faced extraordinary difficulties in its 
struggle for survi val. Yet, even in ••• 
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~·ie hsv~ the experience, too, of Laos . There has been eigh't years 
of military and other aid of the most intensive, indeed, the most extravagant 
kind to that country. There have been millions of costly words and pictures 
and sounds on the virtues of freedom and the evils of communism d.ssemi~ated 
throughout a Kingdom in vlhich, may I say, neither the concept of ;/e.s'ter~ 
freedom or \·!estern colL!llunism can have much meaning. For it is a ~in6dom of 
isolated villagers, still living in a relatively contented, peaceful, Bud~~ist 
culture centuries old. Eight years of aid and words and other operations, in 
the end, have produced scarcely a ripple in Laos, except in the capita: city. 
And what it pruduccd there, to say the least, does not speak well for it. 
Laos is, clearly, in far more danger, today, of a collapse i~to a kind of 
co~unism under outside doreination or, perhaps, to division and destruction 
as a nation, than when this whole process began--when the country was led by 
one who tried to think and act in terms of the Kingdom's neutralism and 
greater self-reliance . 
vTe have the experience of Viet Nam. J!I":i this situation, after years 
of ~litary assistance of a most costly kind, it is discovered that the aid 
went to build the wrong kinds of forces and that it is now necessary to build 
almost from scratch with the aid of thous~nds of additional American training 
and support forces and at an even higher level of annual aid. It is also 
discovered that a great deal more emphasis on political and economic develop-
ment is now required in Viet Nam, although the need for this latter course 
has been pointed out time and again in the Congress for many years. 
There is no longer any escaping the fact that after years of 
enormous expenditures of aid in south Viet Nam, that country is more, 
rather than less, dependent on aid from the United States. VietNam's 
independent survival is less rather than more secure than it was five or 
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six years ago . Once again the bombs explode in Saigon as they have ~o~ cone 
since the early days, which Professor Fishel will remember with ~e, o~ the 
establishment of the Republic in 1953-55 · 
One can only hope that a similar process of increasing depencency 
and increasing insecurity is not now about to begin in Thailand. 
I think, in all honesty, that lTe tr.us~ c0ntrast these sitUc:~.tions 
with those which exist in Burma and in Cambodia. Burma has a non-communist 
independence which is, at this moment, more secure than that of Laos and 
Viet Nam. Yet it has obtained little aid from us. Cambodia has received 
from us a fraction of the per capita aid which has gone to Viet Nam or Laos. 
It has received aid from many countries, including Communist countries. Yet, 
its non-communist independence is certainly not less, it is far more .seccre 
than that of Laos . Indeed, it is, as of this moment, among the most peaceful 
and stable of all the nations of Asia. 
Now, I think we must realize that situations differ in these various 
nations . Communist and other pressures--internal and external--vary. So do 
historic and strategic circumstances. But it is not without significance in 
our comprehension of the total situation in Southeast Asia that in nations in 
which our aid-commitment has been relatively limited, the prospects are no 
worse for the survival of non-communist independence than in those in which 
we are massively committed. 
Before this phenomenon can yield anything of relevance to policy, 
however, we must get clearly i n mind the interests of this nation in Southeast 
Asia which we are trying to protect. For, I presume, that it is on the basis 
of these inter ests t hat we have made this great commitment. 
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A nation's inte~es~s are of two kind~--those which are basic and 
enduring and those which are transitory and peripneral. And history indi-
cates to us that our enduring interests in Southeast Asia are limited. 
also indicates to us that these limited interests tn coU!lllerce, culture and 
security have been, in toe past, most e~~ectively safesuarded by a policy of 
minimum involve!llent . He have, in the pas·t, avoid.P.d interfering in the internal 
polj.tical affa).rs of the Southeast Asian nations. ~·le have, in the past, mini-
mizeiour military commitment on the Southeast Asian mainland--even during the 
gritiJ::iest days of lloi~ld l·lar II . :Je have, in the past, given appropriate en-
couragement ·to the eme:.:-gence of indepeu.dent nationhood in the region. He have 1 
in the past, sought ·to act in a fashion which would not tarnish the symbol of 
freedom and human decency which this nation has long been in Asia or alienate 
the friendship of the peoples of that region, r3gardless of what governments 
might temporarily hold s•ray over them. He have, in the past, through diplomacy, 
sought to do our small share in the preservat).on of peace in that region as part 
of our general inte~est in the rru:,jntene.nca of •rorld peace . 
I do not se:e thaii 'Chesc enduring iutcl·es-.;:; have changed in any signi-
fic.a.nt degree . Our cotliXIlE.rcial and cultu=c.l ccn~ac'Cs with Southeast Asia are 
still limited. Our security interests in Southeast Asia, in terms of the de-
fense of the United States are still limi~ed. 
Yet, it is obvious that in the past decade 'Che policy of minimum 
involvement and, :i.ncidentally, minimum cost, by vrhich we have traditionally 
defended these limited interests, has shifted about 180° to the point of very 
deep involvement and enormous cost. 
I have already pointed ou'C how the Korean conflict precipitated this 
drastic change in course in Southeast Asia . How we reached the present point 
is understandable . The question which we have not yet faced, the question 
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which may now be approaching the point of critical decisions is whether this 
change is to become a permanent part of our fo=eign policy. If it is, teen 
we must be prepared., at best, to carry en annue:4 burden of several hundred 
millions of dollars of military and economic subsidies to enti-co~unist 
governments in the region for many years. He will have to do that vhether 
or not they are responsive governments in terms of their own peoples needs. 
We must be prepared to extend this support in Southeast Asia for the indefi-
nite future through the whole costly mechanism of aid and propaganda. He 
must be prepared to bear the human and material cost of keeping an inde-
term~oate number of combat troops in that region, on garrison duty o= for 
more serious purposes as may be necessary. All these things we must be pre-
pared to do at best . At worst, we ILus·~ be prepared for a possible conflict 
of indefinite depth and duration, depend.~n·c largely on our forces for its 
prosecution. 
These are the facts, the realities of the situation. Grim as 
they are, I believe that it is eminently desirable that they be faced now, 
whatever our decisions may be. 
In all candor I must ask: Is a permanent policy of that kind 
justified on the basio of any enduring interests of the people of the United 
States in Southeast Asia? Is it more valid now, than in the past, to in-
volve ourselves in internal political situations in the countries of that 
region--to maintain any government in a state of quasi-dependency on us for 
the indefinite future? Is it more valid now, than in the past, to assume 
the primary burden for the political, economic and social future of these 
lands? 
I have raised these questions and I would anticipate that you might 
raise others . The fact is that these approaches are, at best, doubtful because 
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they are immensely costly in ratio to any e~during interests of ~he people 
of the u.s. in Southeast Asia. Thay are doubtful because, in the long run, 
they will yield little to the people of this nation and lit~le to the people 
of Sou~l:.east Asia except a multiplics:tion of their already itim:ense social 
and economic difficulties . These approaches are doubtful because tney bring 
upon us a vag~e responsibility for the internal evolu~ion of the nations of 
Southeast Asia, a responsibility which no nation can discharge for another 
in this day and age, a responsibility which it is the right and duty of the 
people end le~ers of those cations themselves to assume, a responsibility 
which, after many costly decades, we relinquished in the Philippines with 
no in~ention of assuming elsewhere . 
\fuile these approaches are doub·tful, there is not assurance that 
they can be avoided. We have accumulated binding treaty commitments over 
the years and integrity demands that these be honored. Moreover, one can-
not know what other nations may do in this situation; and at this late hour 
any improvement in the situation depends on ~~e attitudes of many govern-
ments . It depends heavily on the Chinese in Peking. It depends heavily on 
the Soviet Russian government . It depends on political and military leaders 
in Southeast Asia ann elsewhere in Asia. Indeed, it depends on all govern-
ments which by reason of their membership in the United Nations have a 
measure of responsibility for the maintenance of peace wherever it may be 
threatened. 
But let there be no doubt that it also depends on us. Regardless 
of these o·ther factors, it r emains for us, now, to draw clearly the distinc-
tion between what is enduring and basic and what is transitory and peripheral 
:n our interests with respect to Southeast Asia . It remains for us vo holn 
fast to the one and seek actively to minimize the other, to the end that the 
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in the pursuit not only of our enduring interests but of political slogans and 
shibboleths may cease . 
To the extent that we do what we o~selves must do, I believe we 
shall begin to discern the basis for a new approach to policy in Southeast 
Asia. It will be an approach •,.,rhich will: 
(1) explore actively, intensely and continuously every possi-
bility of minimizing the unilateral activity of the United States in Southeas~ 
Asia in every sphere; 
(2) re-examine SEATO in the light of the recent experience in 
Thailand and not hesitate to attempt to modify or alter it, if other ways of 
maintaining peace and independence in Southeast Asia bacome evident; 
(3) seek vigorously to diffuse, through the United Nations 
or through any other feasible grouping of nations, the enormous burden of 
assisting nations of Southeast Asia to bring their economies and social 
structures more up- to-date; 
(4) place less emphasis on political and military subsidies, 
propaganda and other devices of the cold war and more emphasis on a vigorous 
and persistent trs.di tional diplomacy for the development of a more stable 
situation in the area; 
(5) pay more attention to the manner in which the reasonable 
needs and aspirations of the people of the nations of Southeast Asia are being 
met by their governments in adjusting the whole range of our relations with 
those governments; 
(6) study afresh all the political problems of the region 
which contain the seeds of expanded conflict, with special attention to the 
relevance of the experiences of Burma and ~. {!_.t'v-y~.._Lc-
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It is not certa~n that an:y of these approaches me.y be fruitful. 
The diff~cult~es which he.ve been encountered on all sides in attempting 
to bring about a peaceful settlement in Laos is indicative of what is in-
volved in any significant change fro~ the present course in Southeast Asia. 
But difficulties of change, notwithstanding, the fact remains that the 
present course is, as it has been for a long timA, at best, a mark- time 
course of years and decades of immense cost to the people of the United 
States and, at worst, it is a collision course . 
It is clearly in the interests of this nation to adjust that 
course if it is at all possible to do so with honor and decency. May I 
say, further 1 that this nation owes apology to no na.tj.on if it seeks to 
li&~ten its co~~t~ents in Southeast Asia through a vigorous diplomacy- -as 
~e have been doing with respect to Laos--and a much more discriminating aud 
prudent use of its resources. We have done our share, ~ then our share 
to sustain friendly governments in Asia. We will go on doing it. We •..rill 
meet treaty commit~ents which are binding on our honor. But, at the same 
time, let there be no doubt that the time is long past due when we must 
explore every avenue which may lead to a situation in Southeast Asia, less 
dependent on the resources of this nation for its cement. In the search for 
tre.t situation the President needs the understanding and support of the nation 
e.~d I have no doubt that it •..rill be forthcoming. 
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